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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines social learning regarding HIV infection, using HIV test results and sibling death data 
from Malawi. In the analysis, we compare hypotheses on social learning, selection. and common factors. 
Empirical results show that young women are less likely to be HIV-infected if they observed prime-age 
deaths among their siblings, whereas HIV infection is found to be positively related to prime-age sibling 
deaths among older women. This supports the social-learning hypothesis. Notably, schooling reinforces 
the social-learning effect of sibling deaths on HIV infection in women regardless of age. The above 
findings are robust to age (cohort) effects and unobserved location factors.   
Keywords:  social learning, HIV infection, siblings, Malawi  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
It is increasingly recognized that certain behaviors, such as high-risk sexual conduct, increase the 
probability of HIV infection. Once an individual is infected with HIV/AIDS, he/she will experience 
serious health problems with substantial economic burdens, most often leading to death. Due to the 
irreversibility of infection, agents cannot learn of HIV consequences from their own experiences, but 
instead must learn from the experiences of others in order to optimize their behavior. Therefore, social 
learning and social networks affect the agent’s perceptions and behavior (e.g., Kohler, Behrman, and 
Watkins 2007; Helleringer and Kohler 2005).
1   
The literature shows that social learning is also important in some empirical contexts, such as 
technology adoption and schooling investments (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 2004; 
Yamauchi 2007; Conley and Udry 2004). In particular, learning about HIV is comparable to learning in 
human capital investment (Yamauchi 2007), where irreversibility excludes the possibility of learning-by-
doing. In the case of schooling investment, agents cannot learn of returns from their own investments, 
since, in addition to being irreversible, the investment occurs over a relatively long period.   
This paper aims to empirically verify the social-learning hypothesis using HIV test result data 
from Malawi. For this purpose, we use the prime-age death (age 15-49) of siblings (reference group) to 
investigate the agents’ learning, assuming that siblings’ deaths convey important information on the 
relationship between the siblings’ behavior and HIV infection and AIDS.
2 We hypothesize that agents 
learn from deaths (or illness) of their siblings, subsequently changing their behavior in order to lower 
their own HIV infection risk.
3 
The use of siblings’ death information allows us to exclude the possibility of direct transmission 
between agents and their reference groups. Even though agents may learn from their neighbors, it is also 
possible for them to become infected directly from their neighbors through sexual interactions, making 
the neighbor group inappropriate for use as a reference group. Although siblings do not necessarily live in 
the same location and are not necessarily physically close, their social proximity is high during their 
formative years. This setting is suitable for social learning, with the caveat that they may share (often 
unobserved) family-fixed characteristics that could increase the positive correlation of their behavioral 
outcomes.  
When seeking to identify social learning in the context of HIV infection, we must also consider 
other possibilities beyond sibling interactions. First, a dynamic selection process is involved in HIV 
infection among siblings. For example, those who take higher risks in their sexual activities are more 
likely to become HIV-infected and die of the disease. Given that there are innate differences in risk 
preference, siblings can have different infection probabilities, with less risk-averse agents will be more 
likely to become infected and therefore die of AIDS, compared to the more risk-averse agents. Thus, if 
the women in our sample are risk averters while those who died of the disease were risk lovers, we should 
observe a negative correlation between prime-age death (from AIDS) among siblings and HIV infection. 
However, this selection process is likely to take a rather long period, and such a negative association 
would be due to dynamic selection ex post. Therefore, it is highly likely that we would observe this 
association in the sample of older women but not in young women.   
                                                      
1 Recent empirical studies examine the formation of perceptions on AIDS. For example, see Bernardi (2002), Kengeya-
Kayondo et al. (1999), London and Aroyds (2000), Smith and Watkins (2005), and Watkins (2004). 
2 Information on sibling’s illness is also potentially important to the agent’s decision making on sexual behavior, thus 
determining HIV infection risks. However, the data we use (the Demographic and Heath Survey, Maternal Mortality Module) 
does not capture this information, as it is mainly designed to investigate child mortality among the respondent’s siblings.  
3 Manski (1993) clarified the importance of identifying a reference group in empirical studies of social learning and 
reflection problems. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (2004) and Yamauchi (2007) assumed that agents learn from 
neighbors in the same village, based on geographical proximity. Conley and Udry (2004) used information flow channels (from 
their survey data) to carefully identify paths through which agents learn. In HIV/AIDS research, Kohler et al. (2007) and 
Helleringer and Kohler (2005) attempt to identify social networks through which an agent’s perceptions are formed.  2 
 
Second, as discussed above, unobserved family-fixed factors may determine HIV infection 
among siblings. In other words, if the family factors are significant, HIV outcomes will be positively 
correlated among siblings but less so across families. Therefore, our empirical analysis of social learning 
in HIV infection critically depends on how and whether we can identify social learning against the above 
two alternative scenarios. 
In our empirical analysis, we directly use information on HIV test results among Malawian 
women, under the assumption that HIV infection ultimately represents a behavioral consequence that 
reflects diverse individual choices in this high-HIV prevalence setting.
4 In 2004, antiretroviral treatment 
was not generally available to the public in Malawi.
5 Given that the life expectancy of an HIV-infected 
agent is fairly low in the absence of treatment, one study shows that women without antiretroviral 
treatment survive only 43.7 months (Holmes et al. 2006). Women found to be HIV-infected in 2004 are 
unlikely to have been infected before the infection of siblings who died of the disease. In other words, 
respondents who were HIV-positive in the 2004 survey must have been infected within a relatively short 
period prior to the survey. Conversely, assuming that survival time after HIV infection is relatively 
consistent for all siblings in the absence of treatment, a sibling’s death means that the sibling was infected 
earlier than the agent. 
To verify our hypothesis, we also examine condom use and extra marital affairs. The information 
on these choices can contain measurement errors, and therefore does not provide a precise measurement 
of behavioral consequence; accordingly, we use it as supporting evidence, but focus our main analysis on 
directly examining HIV infection. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data and empirical strategy. We use 
data on HIV infection in a subsample of women, drawn from the Demographic and Health Survey in 
Malawi (2004). Section 3 summarizes our empirical results. First, we find that young women are less 
likely to be HIV-infected if they observed prime-age deaths among their siblings. This supports the social 
learning hypothesis. However, HIV infection is found to be positively related to prime-age sibling deaths 
among older women. Second, schooling reinforces the negative effect of sibling deaths on HIV infection, 
regardless of age. This suggests that human capital helps agents learn from the prime-age deaths of 
siblings. These findings are robust to age (cohort) effects and unobserved location factors. Concluding 
remarks are mentioned in the final section. 
                                                      
4 Marston, Harriss, and Slaymaker (2008) analyze non-response biases in the HIV test data, but conclude that such bias is 
not significant in the DHS. This may potentially bias our estimates to an unknown degree.  
5 Of the estimated 150,000 people who needed antiviral treatment in June 2005, an estimated 18,000-23,000 (12-15 percent) 
were receiving it.  3 
 
2.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This study uses data drawn from the 2004 Malawi Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). The DHS 
surveys, conducted in various developing countries since the mid-1980s, are nationally representative 
surveys designed to collect information on marriage, fertility, family planning, reproductive health, child 
health, and HIV/AIDS. The survey focuses on reproductive-age women aged 15-49. For our purposes, the 
DHS survey is a uniquely large database containing information on HIV test results among a subsample 
of respondents; we use this subsample herein.  
The survey asks respondents to list their siblings and indicate whether or not each sibling is alive 
at the time of the survey. Table A.1 shows distributions of number of siblings and age in the study 
population. The population is relatively young with median age of 24. The average number of siblings is 
5 to 6. The available data include additional information on each sibling’s current age (if alive) and year 
of death and age at death (if deceased). For the purpose of our study, the birth-death records of 
respondents’ siblings are particularly important for estimating their prime-age deaths. We compute the 
mortality rate from the death records of the respondents’ siblings.
6 
Since the respondents are, by definition, alive at the time of the survey (2004), the mortality rate 
estimates could be biased downward if survival probabilities are positively correlated among siblings. 
Conditional on an agent’s survival at the time of the survey, the likelihood of her sibling’s survival is 
higher than that of an agent who had already died by the time of the survey.  
In our analysis, we use siblings as a reference group. This has the advantage of allowing us to 
exclude direct transmission of HIV between agents and the reference group. Neighbors can also be used 
as a reference group in some cases, but we cannot exclude the possibility of sexual transmission of HIV 
from this group. Accordingly, we herein focus on siblings as the reference group from which the agents 
learn about HIV. 
We use HIV status as a measure of an agent’s behavioral consequence (outcome). HIV infection 
status has the benefit of smaller measurement errors compared to other behavioral choices, such as 
condom use or partner choice. However, the available information on current infection status does not 
allow us to identify the age at which the agents became infected. Given the fact that many infected 
individuals die of AIDS within several years of infection, we take current infection status as reflecting 
cumulative behavioral choices over a few years prior to the survey. 
In the empirical analysis, we estimate the following equation, 
  () ij i a ij j ij
a
yD I a a α βγ μ ε =+ + = + + ∑ , 
where yij is HIV infection status (yij = 1 if infected, or 0  otherwise) of agent (woman) i living in location 
j, Di is the proportion of prime-age deaths among her siblings (see below), aij is her age, μj is the location-
fixed effect, and εij is an error term. 
Di is defined as 
  ( ) []
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where  1 ik d , =  if i’s sibling k is dead and 0  otherwise, 
d
ik a ,  is the age at which sibling k died, and 
s
i N  is 
the total number of siblings belonging to i. 
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 Similarly, Ueyama and Yamauchi (2008) used the prime-age mortality rate constructed from the sibling data to analyze the 
impact of prime-age mortality on marriage age among young woman. 4 
 
By definition, if  0
s
i N = , Di cannot be defined. We set  i D  = 0 in this case, but it would also 
make sense to distinguish between the two cases:  i D  = 0 when  ( ) 1 1p r i m e a g e 0
i S d
ik ik k Id a ,, = = ,∈ = ∑  
and  0
s
i N = , since the situation of  0
s
i N =  creates no information.   
As we described in this section, social learning from the reference group of siblings implies a 
negative effect of sibling deaths on HIV infection (β < 0). This prediction contrasts to the positive 
correlation that can arise from family-fixed factors ( 0 ij i ED ε
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ > ). Therefore, if social learning is 
important, we are estimating the upper bound on the effect of prime-age sibling death on HIV infection 
status.  
Potentially, unobserved fixed components (beside family-fixed effects), as well as common or 
correlated shocks, can have similar effects on both HIV infection and sibling deaths, causing a positive 
correlation between sibling death and HIV infection, thereby creating an upward bias. To partially 
mitigate this potential problem, we include location-fixed effects to control for common or correlated 
shocks specific to each location. For example, we control for information locally available in the village, 
and common behavioral patterns in the village.  
In our setting, however, we cannot control for individual-fixed components in the empirical 
analysis, as we do not have information on dynamic changes in HIV infection status or changes in prime-
age deaths among siblings. If such a factor is correlated with siblings’ deaths, this factor may bias our 
estimates. The nature of HIV infection and AIDS death means that the length of time an agent stays 
infected is likely to be bounded. This implies that the current HIV infection status reflects a relatively 
recent change of status from negative to positive. To check robustness of the above point, we also 
examine the effect of “recent” sibling deaths in the past 10 years on current HIV infection status.  
As noted previously, a process of natural selection in the dynamics of HIV infection among 
siblings may lead to a negative correlation between HIV infection and prime-age sibling death. However, 
since this selection process would take a rather long period to screen out those who are likely to get 
infected, we are likely to observe such a negative correlation only among older women. Therefore, it is 
important to note possible age heterogeneity. 
In the estimation, we include age-fixed effects to control for possible cohort effects. Since the 
infection process is cumulative in the sense that risky action at one time can cause an irreversible 
transition to HIV-positive status, we expect HIV infection to increase with age (see Figure 1).   














3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 shows our main findings on the effect of prime-age sibling death on HIV infection in the 
population of women aged 15 to 39, normalized by the proportion of siblings who died in their prime. In 
the estimation, we include all age dummies with location-fixed effects. 
Table 1. The effects of prime-age death among siblings on HIV infection 
Sample women of 15 to 39.  Dependent: =1 if HIV infection, and =0 otherwise 
       Age <=25  Age >26 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings  0.1176**  -0.1574*    0.3145 -0.2081 
 (1.65)  (1.92)    (1.15)  (0.90) 
  * Age 26 or above    0.4060***       
   (3.46)       
Squared proportion of prime-age death      -0.8837* 0.6581* 
       (1.67)  (1.79) 
No sibling  0.0563  0.0601    0.0792 0.0627 
 (1.07)  (1.15)    (1.07)  (1.79) 
Age dummies  Yes
a Yes    Yes Yes 
Location-fixed effects  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  2,428  2,428    1,367 1,061 
R squared (within)  0.0571  0.0622    0.0564  0.0303 
Notes:  Absolute t-values are in parentheses, using robust standard errors with location clusters; *** significant at 1 percent, ** 
significant at 5 percent, and * significant at 10 percent.  There are 64 observations with no sibling. 
a Age dummies and location-fixed effects are included. 
We see a positive but insignificant effect of prime-age sibling death on HIV infection (Table 1, 
column 1). From this estimation, we also capture age effects on HIV infection status. Figure 1 shows age-
fixed effect estimates, demonstrating that HIV infection in the sample increases monotonically when 
agents are in their twenties and stays more or less constant when agents are in their thirties.    
To capture potential age heterogeneity (Table 1, column 2), we include an indicator that takes the 
value of one if the respondent is age 26 or above, and interact this with the measure of prime-age sibling 
death. Interestingly, we see that sibling death significantly decreases the likelihood of HIV infection 
among young women (aged 25 or less), while it increases the likelihood of infection among older women 
(aged 26 or above). Preliminary analyses confirm that this age threshold at age 26 explains the 
heterogeneity; HIV infection among siblings has a greater effect on the behavioral choices made by the 
younger group compared to the older group. Sibling death significantly decreases on the likelihood of 
HIV infection among young women aged 26 or less. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 split the sample at age 26. We find a clear contrast in the parameter 
estimates between the two groups. In the group of women aged 25 or less (Column 3), the effect is 
concave, showing a negative effect once the proportion of prime-age sibling death is large (above 
0.1844). In contrast, the effect is convex among women aged 26 or above, showing a positive effect when 
the proportion of prime-age sibling death is above 0.1739. 
As shown in Figure 1, the age of 26 appears to be a threshold in HIV infection behavior. HIV 
infection clearly increases up to the age of 26 and plateaus thereafter. This is consistent with our finding 
that social learning is important among women younger than 26. Our findings support the notion that 
when agents are young and potentially exposed to HIV infection risks, the value of information from 
sibling deaths is high and the behavioral reaction to sibling deaths becomes significant. 
The above results support social learning, since we think social learning is important when 
women are young. Our results do not support the selection hypothesis. The fact that we could not control 6 
 
for family-fixed effects (as well as individual-fixed effects) implies that the above estimates are at best an 
upper bound for the true effect. 
Table 2 shows how education affects the sibling-death effect on HIV infection. In Column 1, we 
include an indicator that takes the value of one if the respondent completes higher than primary education, 
and is zero otherwise. We find that schooling has a negative but insignificant effect on HIV infection. 
Table 2. Education effect on social learning 
Sample:  women of 15 to 39.  Dependent: = 1 if HIV infection, and = 0 otherwise 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings  0.1134 0.1533**  -0.0564 
 (1.61)  (2.00)  `(0.65) 
Schooling completed higher than primary  -0.0489*  -0.0313  -0.0348 
 (1.85)  (1.08)  (1.20) 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings * Schooling   -0.3963**  -0.7025*** 
  higher than primary    (2.03)  (3.12) 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings * Age 26      0.3036** 
  or above      (2.46) 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings * Schooling      0.7088** 
  higher than primary * Age 26 or above      (2.08) 
No sibling dummy  0.0529  0.0541  0.0561 
 (1.02)  (1.05)  (1.10) 
Age dummies  Yes
a Yes Yes 
Location-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  2,428  2,428  2,428 
R squared (within)  0.0594  0.0614  0.0679 
Notes:  Absolute t-values are in parentheses, using robust standard errors with location clusters; *** significant at 1 percent, ** 
significant at 5 percent, and * significant at 10 percent.  There are 64 observations with no sibling. 
a Age dummies and location-fixed effects are included. 
In Column 2, we interact the education indicator with the proportion of prime-age deaths among 
siblings. Interestingly, prime-age sibling death decreases the likelihood of HIV infection among educated 
agents, while sibling death increases the likelihood of infection among uneducated agents. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis put forth by Schultz (1975) on the ability to deal with disequilibria. That is, 
the more educated can efficiently learn about HIV from their siblings who died in prime age. 
We further interact the education and age-26-or-above indicators with the proportion of prime-
age sibling deaths (Table 1, column 3), and find that sibling death decreases the likelihood of HIV 
infection among educated women. Similar to the findings shown in Table 1, we find that sibling death 
increases the likelihood of HIV infection among women aged 26 or above, while the education effect is 
weaker (insignificant) among older women. 
As shown in Table 3, we next investigate reported condom use and extramarital affairs, as an 
additional measure of observable behavioral choice. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for condom use, 
which is positively associated with prime-age sibling death and educational attainment. In contrast to our 
above finding, the interaction of education and prime-age sibling death is not significant. 
Columns 3 and 4 show that the death of prime-age siblings does not affect the likelihood of 
extramarital affairs, but education is positively related to the likelihood of affairs. However, education has 
a negative effect on the likelihood of extramarital affairs when the respondent observed the prime-age 
death of a sibling. This is consistent with our findings with regard to HIV infection status.  7 
 
Table 3. The effects of prime-age death among siblings on HIV prevention 
Sample:  women of 15 to 39 
  Condom use    Extramarital sex 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings 0.1010**  0.1494***    0.0105  0.0542 
 (2.01)  (2.84)    (0.21)  (1.03) 
Schooling completed higher than primary    0.1148***      0.0853*** 
   (3.07)      (2.87) 
Proportion of prime-age death among     -0.3941      -0.3741 
  siblings * schooling higher than primary    (1.46)      (1.63) 
No sibling dummy  0.0562  0.0652    -0.0144  -0.0085 
 (1.21)  (1.37)    (0.59)  (0.36) 
Age dummies  Yes
a Yes    Yes  Yes 
Location-fixed effects Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  1,934  1,934    2,428  2,428 
R squared (within)  0.0525  0.0728    0.0228  0.0328 
Notes:  Absolute t-values are in parentheses, using robust standard errors with location clusters; *** significant at 1 percent, ** 
significant at 5 percent, and * significant at 10 percent. There are 64 observations with no sibling. 
a Age dummies and location-fixed effects are included. 
In Table 4, we show estimation results on HIV infection using an alternative definition of prime-
age sibling death by restricting death cases in the 10-year period prior to the survey (1994-2004) to 
capture relatively recent sibling deaths.
7 This restriction is important because the current HIV infection 
status (dependent variable) implies relatively recent infection (otherwise, the respondent would have died 
in our study setting, where proper treatment was not available prior to the survey period). The results are 
similar to the above findings, and remain robust. 
Table 4. The effects of prime-age death among siblings in previous 10 years on HIV infection 
Sample: women of 15 to 39.  Dependent: = 1 if HIV infection, and = 0 otherwise 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings 0.1251  -0.1805***  0.1215  0.1617  -0.0770* 
 (1.60)  (2.11)  (1.56)  (1.89)  (0.85) 
* Age 26 or above    0.4876***       
   (3.75)       
Schooling completed higher than primary     -0.0493*  -0.0345  -0.0394 
     (1.86)  (1.18)  (1.35) 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings         -0.3529  -0.6593*** 
  * Schooling higher than primary        (1.56)  (2.87) 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings * Age           0.3709*** 
  26 or above          (2.70) 
Proportion of prime-age death among siblings *           0.8134** 
Schooling higher than primary * Age 26 or above          (1.98) 
No sibling dummy  0.0552  0.0589  0.0518  0.0527  0.0546 
 (1.05)  (1.12)  (1.00)  (1.02)  (1.06) 
Age dummies  Yes
a Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Location-fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  2,428  2,428  2,428  2,428  2,428 
R squared (within)  0.0569  0.0633  0.0593  0.0607  0.0688 
Notes:  Absolute t-values are in parentheses, using robust standard errors with location clusters; *** significant at 1 percent, ** 
significant at 5 percent, and * significant at 10 percent.  There are 64 observations with no sibling.  
a Age dummies and location-fixed effects are included. 
                                                      
7 We were able to define sibling death in the 5 years prior to the survey, but preliminary analysis revealed that this mortality 
rate is small enough to reduce the statistical power of our work.  8 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
We herein show that young women in Malawi are less likely to be HIV-infected if they observed prime-
age deaths among their siblings, which supports the social learning hypothesis. However, HIV infection is 
found to be positively related to prime-age sibling deaths among older women. Our results indicate that 
young agents learn about the risks associated with HIV from the deaths of their siblings and change their 
behavior accordingly. The above findings are robust to age (cohort) effects and unobserved village-level 
factors.   
Notably, schooling reinforces the social-learning effect of sibling deaths on HIV infection 
regardless of age cohorts, implying that education increases the efficiency of learning. In our analysis, 
education itself does not directly decrease HIV infection, but rather affects it through social learning 
effects related to sibling death. Therefore, our analysis indicates that education not only directly changes 
knowledge about HIV/AIDS through schooling, but also changes learning efficiency, thus helping agents 
alter their behavior to avoid HIV infection. 
Our study also showed two observable implications consistent with stylized facts in developing 
countries. First, HIV infection increases at the initial stage, probably because of lack of knowledge and 
information on the nature of HIV/AIDS, but as the information accumulates, the infection rate starts 
decreasing. Second, at the initial phase of the AIDS epidemic, education, which is correlated with other 
socioeconomic characteristics, is positively associated with HIV infection. However, our results suggest 
that the effect of education on HIV infection becomes negative as the information accumulates and 
education helps agents decipher the optimal reaction to the risk of HIV infection.  Whether the above 
findings from Malawi can also be confirmed in other populations is an interesting question, but beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
 9 
 
APPENDIX:  A SIMPLE MODEL 
We herein describe a simple model used to relate new information created through death of siblings 
(reference group) to social learning. Notably, we can exclude direct transmission of HIV from the 
reference group. Agents learn from the successes and failures of different behavioral choices with regard 
to HIV infection. Death incidence in the reference group signals an action taken by the individual in the 
reference group. Agents learn from deaths in the reference group to optimize their behavior, as they 
cannot learn from their own experiences (experiments).   
Assume that there are two types of actions, x = a,b. Action a is safe behavior, while action b is 
the risk-taking choice. The utility cost of action is c(a) > c(b) > 0. Both actions are observable. 
The causal relationship from action to result is as follows. Pr(z = death|x = a) = p1, and 
Pr(z = death|x = b) = p2 where p1 < p2. However, agents do not know the probabilities. For simplicity, 
assume that p1 = 0.
8 In case of death, agents have a negative utility, u(death) <<0. We also assume, for 
simplicity, that u(alive) = 0. 
For agents, the question is whether p1 is sufficiently lower than p2 (gain is sufficiently large or 
not), given that c(a) > c(b). In other words, risk-neutral agents learn about probability difference, p1 – p2. 
Assume that agent’s prior on E0[p1 - p2] = 0 at the initial stage, i.e., agents do not know the difference in 
the death probability that the two actions can make. 
For simplicity, we ignore intertemporal preference and strategic interactions among agents. Thus, 
the description below is regarded as that of social learning from a previous generation. 
Assume that agents have heterogeneity in taste, vj ~ F(v), that affects the agent’s expected utility. 
The agent will choose action a if 
E0[p1 – p2]u(death) – (c(a) – c(b)) + vj = -(c(a) – c(b)) + vj > 0. 
Thus, they choose a if vj > c(a) – c(b), and b otherwise. Those who have vj below c(a) – c(b) 
choose action b, and some of them die with probability p2. If nobody chooses b (e.g., the lower bound for 
vj is above c(a) – c(b), and nobody dies of AIDS), then it is impossible for an agent to learn of p2 and the 
probability difference, p1 – p2. 





^p I z death x a
N
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where  kk E^ p p ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =  and  ( ) k Var ^p  
1 (1 )
k kk N p p =− ,  12 k = , . Under the assumption that p1 = 0, we have 
Var(^p1) = 0.
9 
In the second stage, agents can estimate p1 – p2 to form the expected utility. They will choose 
action a if 
[p1 - ^p2]u(death) + vj > c(a) – c(b), 
where the first term on the left-hand side is strictly positive since u(death) << 0 and p1 = 0. New 
information created through deaths will tend to make agents choose the safe action a under the reasonable 
range of vj. If there is no death, agents cannot estimate p2 (and p1 – p2), and therefore some of agents will 
choose action b. 
                                                      
8We can relax this assumption, but the main result remains robust. 
9This assumption can be relaxed. 10 
 
An implication from the above model is that the mortality rate increases at the initial stage, but 
decreases thereafter if social learning works at the second stage. The crucial assumption in the above 
story is the observability of action: agents can learn of the causality from action choice to the 
consequence of HIV/AIDS. 
Table A.1. Number of siblings and age in the study population 
  Frequency Percent  Cumulative 
Number of siblings       
0 64  2.64  2.64 
1 95  3.91  6.55 
2 158  6.51  13.06 
3 225  9.27  22.32 
4 294  12.11  34.43 
5 377  15.53  49.96 
6 364  14.99  64.95 
7 324  13.34  78.29 
8 199  8.20  86.49 
9 168  6.92  93.41 
10 82  3.38  96.79 
11 46  1.89  98.68 
12 23  0.95  99.63 
13 5  0.21  99.84 
15 1  0.04  99.88 
16 1  0.04  99.92 
18 2  0.08  100.00 
Age      
15 96  3.95  3.95 
16 120  4.94  8.90 
17 81  3.34  12.23 
18 123  5.07  17.30 
19 125  5.15  22.45 
20 156  6.43  28.87 
21 119  4.90  33.77 
22 182  7.50  41.27 
23 113  4.65  45.92 
24 121  4.98  50.91 
25 131  5.40  56.30 
26 102  4.20  60.50 
27 103  4.24  64.74 
28 108  4.45  69.19 
29 83  3.42  72.61 
30 103  4.24  76.85 
31 61  2.51  79.37 
32 77  3.17  82.54 
33 68  2.80  85.34 
34 79  3.25  88.59 
35 74  3.05  91.64 
36 62  2.55  94.19 
37 38  1.57  95.76 
38 55  2.27  98.02 
39 48  1.98  100.00 
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